Clean and DDF u soil so 2 PUT FIREMAN in the subject and gay dudes dont bother Waiting for eternity. ,i lov to camp like most kinds of music, i am 5,6 190 lbs, just some one thats to do thing s with,,brian That includes a job or source of income. Reminist for Prince Charming Im Annalice I'm Very Nice, Outgoing, Kind-Hearted,And Very Outragous I like to find vintage unique stuff that makes up my own style I Live in Vail AZ (Bum fucking Nowhere) I'm a Typical Teenage Girl Things I like My Awesomely Amazing Family And Friends Make Up MusicLIFE Fashion Cosmetology Talking On The Fucktoy for thck and hung cocki swallow Walking on the beach right on the tip of the water because It feels like you are on the side of the world Diamonds Anything Sour Taking photos Singing My Cell Phone My Dogs Mindy Mork and Dj Dancing Going out on nights oepn the town My ideal boy is black, gorgeous, taller than me (Im 5'4 BTW) Independent, and 18-24.
Sometimes you speak up and our teacher shoots you down, but I always agree with what you have to say. You should at least be willing to touch base and keep the firing burning. U WERE AT THE HILTON (YOU WALKED BY THE GIFT SHOP AND SMILED ) m4w NICE YOUNG LADY IN A BLACKBLUE DRESS. Someone looking to balance out the day to day monotony.
I had spent the entire afternoon hanging out and chatting with him at the bar where he worked, thinking maybe, just maybe, this would be the day he revealed that he felt the same way about me. So I spent the night alone, crying, and wrestling once again with the heartbreak of being rejected by someone who liked me — a lot — but not the way I wanted them to.
I was in my late twenties at this point, and this was an unhappily familiar feeling. You suffer, you cry, you write poems, and then eventually you move on. You want them to stay in your life. And because you know them better, your feelings for them have deeper roots and take longer to die down. It hurt when I was thirteen, and it hurt when I was But I did learn a lot of things that made the hurt bearable, and enabled me to have relationships with the people I loved that were healthy for both of us.
It is normal to feel grief, anger, denial , and all the other things a person might feel after loss. Your feelings about the person you love are real, and the hopes you had had are real. And neither of these are healthy. When the person you love is a friend, the fact that they clearly like you can make it even harder to process as a loss. You may end up going through the grief process multiple times. The important thing is to remember that these feelings are normal — and healthy.
They take you toward healing, even if the road seems impossibly long and twisted. Extra space could mean cutting in half the time you spend talking to them. It could mean taking a few weeks or even months off from seeing them at all. It could mean setting aside certain days and times where you focus on other relationships, other activities, anything but them.
Pick what seems to work for you — but do something to create some space. In the last few decades, neuroscience has given us a little more insight into why we feel those things. For me, for example, my feelings tend to be expressed in obsessive, intrusive thoughts rather than surging rushes of emotion or impulsive actions. But when you look at the neurobiology of lost love , you can see a lot of common threads in the thoughts, feelings, and actions that unrequited love tends to create.
The feelings are just as strong and real after we have names for the hormones that contribute to them as they were before. But knowing the biological basics can give you hope, though. In those moments, it can be helpful to remember that my feelings are related to the surges of hormones in my brain, and that it is completely normal and expected for those hormones to show up under these circumstances.
It just puts them in context. Another helpful insight that neurobiology gives us is this: Romantic, passionate love tends to burn brighter and longer when there are obstacles. In the normal run of things, in a happy and healthy relationship, the butterflies and thrills of new love will fade away in anywhere from six months to two years, with 18 months being the most typical lifespan.
There are so many good things in life that have nothing to do with either romance or sex! I make playlists of songs that are about other things. I stay far, far away from movies and books that center around a romantic plot. So many of our romantic stories paint an unrealistic view of love. They show someone persistently pursuing the object of their affections and finally winning them over.
They show unrequited love as something that haunts your life forever. Rarely do our stories show the things that happen more often in real life: If your feelings for your friend were a person, what kind of person would they be? And then they say something that makes me feel again how wonderful they are and how great it would be if they loved me the way I love them, and—hey look!
My other pal, Feelings, has joined us! It changes the dynamic, almost as if an actual other person came over and sat down with us. As a third party in a relationship, Feelings is pretty high-maintenance. Whatever the subject of conversation, it finds a way to connect it back to what it wants and what it thinks is important.
It gives an intensity and a focus to your time with them. It helps me deal better when they show up. Maybe, someday, Feelings will go away completely and leave your friendship in peace. Only time will tell. As big and needy and disruptive as unrequited love can be, it is also a tremendous source of energy. For me, a lot of the pain of unrequited love comes from feeling that energy wasted and meaningless. It can also drive me to accomplish other things. To learn a new skill.
To seek out new experiences. To travel and expand my world. For months, most of my free time was consumed in studying and practicing for the LSAT.
I had my sights set on a top school, and I wanted to get a score that would make it attainable. Also, I am hilariously unsuited for a career like law. Fortunately, I figured all that out before actually going to law school. But I have a really impressive LSAT score to show for all those months, and more importantly, a boost of self-confidence in what I can achieve if I set my mind to it. But try listening to them and seeing where else you might be able to channel their energy.
While I was getting over Shea, I made a hat. I spun the yarn myself and knit it in a design that reminded me of one of the things I loved most about him. While I was working on it, I let myself really dwell on my feelings for him, my sadness, all the things that were wonderful about him that made me want to be his partner.
When I set down the knitting, I tried to set aside the thoughts, too, and work on building other good things in my life. The hat was done before my feelings were. When I see the magic and beauty in a person, that never really goes away. But the intensity of desire does. Now when I talk to Shea, my happiness is straightforward, not mixed with longing and pain. She writes for various publications and has her own blog here.
She lives in the Philadelphia area with her poly family and three cats. Follow her on Twitter lirelyn. Found this article helpful? Help us keep publishing more like it by becoming a member! Become an EF Member. Like Our Facebook Page. Follow Us On Instagram.
But those women already feel taken to pieces also by Greer, who said: Greer and the Deneuve group are notallolderfeminists. We forget, in the west, just how transformative the past few decades have been.
On American television, even married couples on TV sitcoms were depicted in separate beds. The restrictions placed on female agency at the time — especially through the institution of marriage, which women entered younger and were less enfranchised to leave than now — are staggering to imagine. Britain did not make marital rape illegal until For feminists who survived those generations, it must seem extraordinary to have battled at such risk for liberation to hear younger women discuss sexual contracts, a desire for boundaries, a wish not to be sexualised by men in their lives.
Like the unconscious in classical psychoanalytic theory, the semiotic decenters the self. One may try to express one's thoughts in definite, straightforward language, yet because of the semiotic aspects of one's utterances, what one says carries no single meaning and is amenable to being interpreted in more than one way. In Kristeva's view, this is all to the good, for accessing the semiotic—that which is conveyed, often inadvertently, by the style of an utterance—kindles social critique.
The semiotic gives expression to repressed, unconscious material. According to Kristeva, what society systematically represses provides clues to what is oppressive about society and how society needs to be changed. Thus, she discerns a vital ethical potential in the semiotic Kristeva In one respect, Nancy Chodorow's appropriation of object relations theory parallels Kristeva's project of reclaiming and revaluing femininity, for Chodorow's account of the relational self reclaims and revalues feminine mothering capacities.
But whereas Kristeva focuses on challenging the homogeneous self and the bright line between reason, on the one hand, and emotion and desire, on the other, Chodorow focuses on challenging the self-subsisting self with its sharp self-other boundaries. Chodorow's claim that the self is inextricable from interpersonal relationships calls into question the decontextualized individualism of the Kantian ethical subject and homo economicus. Chodorow sees the self as relational in several respects Chodorow Every child is cared for by an adult or adults, and every individual is shaped for better or worse by this emotionally charged interaction.
As a result of feelings of need and moments of frustration, the infant becomes differentiated from its primary caregiver and develops a sense of separate identity. Concomitantly, a distinctive personality emerges. By selectively internalizing and recombining elements of their experience with other people, children develop characteristic traits and dispositions. Moreover, Chodorow attributes the development of a key interpersonal capacity to nurturance. Children gain a sense of their worthiness by internalizing the nurturance they receive and directing it toward themselves, and they learn to respect and respond to other people by internalizing their experience of nurturance and projecting it toward others.
Whereas Kristeva understands the self as a dynamic interplay between the feminine semiotic and the masculine symbolic, Chodorow understands the self as linked to cultural norms of feminine interpersonal responsiveness. For Chodorow, the rigidly differentiated, compulsively rational, stubbornly independent self is a masculine defensive formation—a warped form of the relational self—that develops as a result of fathers' negligible involvement in childcare.
Feminist philosophers have noted strengths and weaknesses in both of these views. For example, Kristeva's questionable-subject-in-process seems to enshrine and endorse the very gender dichotomy that causes women so much grief. The association of the mother with the unruly and ambiguous semiotic may obscure the rich affect attunement and preverbal dialogues between male and female caregivers and their already socially-oriented infants Willett Still, Kristeva's analyses of the psychic, social, and political potency of gender figurations underscore the need for feminist counter-imagery to offset culturally entrenched, patriarchal images of womanhood and the unconscious desires and fantasies that these images buttress.
And Chodorow's appreciation of the relational self together with her diagnosis of the damage wrought by hyperindividuation advances feminist demands for equitable parenting practices and stronger relational conceptions of the self.
These contributions notwithstanding, both of these views have come under attack for heterosexist biases as well as for inattention to other forms of difference among women.
Poststructuralists and critical race theorists have been particularly vocal about this failure to come to grips with the diversity of gender, and they have offered accounts of the self designed to accommodate difference. For Butler, psychodynamic accounts of the self, including Kristeva's and Chodorow's, camouflage the performative nature of the self and collaborate in the cultural conspiracy that maintains the illusion that one has an emotionally anchored, interior identity that is derived from one's biological nature, which is manifest in one's genitalia.
Such accounts are pernicious. The solution, in Butler's view, is to question the categories of biological sex, polarized gender, and determinate sexuality that serve as markers of personal identity, to treat the construction of identity as a site of political contestation, and to embrace the subversive potential of unorthodox performances and parodic identities.
Her later work continues to emphasize the relationality of the self through its dispossession by the very discursive structures that call the self into existence.
To become a transsexual with a diagnosis of Gender Identity Disorder and gain access to therapeutic and medical techniques can for some provide a meaningful narrative and a liberating experience. At the same time, the new norms for a transsexual identity may generate their own exclusionary politics. Heyes addresses the exclusionary processes of identity politics by returning to Foucault's incomplete thoughts on care of the self, arguing that attentiveness to the body and its capacities to resist norms opens possibilities for new forms of becoming McWhorter ; Heyes By and large, much of recent feminist philosophy of the self troubles the autonomy model, typically by introducing psychodynamic and relational features.
Kelly Oliver's post-Levinasian approach emphasizes the radical exteriority of the other to the self, locating the origin or prompt for the self from this radical exteriority. Oliver uses the motif of witnessing to explore the ways in which the othering can be acknowledged but not known. On the other hand, some contemporary feminist philosophers express concern that the sorts of conceptions sketched above are detrimental to feminist aims Benhabib Still, feminists have moved psychoanalytic theories, object relations theories, and poststructuralism forward to introduce new conceptions of the relational self as not only embodied, psycho-dynamic, and social, but also intersectional and multilayered.
Increasingly, over the past several decades, biological, biosocial, and intersectional layers of the relational self have gained more prominence.
Intersectional theories of the self brought forward by African American feminists adapt aspects of poststructuralist theory to the purposes of critical race theory Williams ; Crenshaw Noting that gender, race, and class stratification do not operate in isolation from one another but rather interact to produce compound effects, these theorists conceive of the individual as an intersectional subject—a site where structures of domination and subordination but also agency converge Moraga and Anzaldua ; King ; Crenshaw ; Willett Intersectional theory does not purport to offer a comprehensive theory of the self; rather, its aim is to capture those aspects of selfhood that are conditioned by membership in subordinated or privileged social groups.
Gloria Anzaldua's groundbreaking work develops the mestiza as a central figure for understanding a new kind of self with an ambiguous, fluid identity. The mestiza experiences a sense of constant displacement and in-betweenness but also modes of meaning-making. Moreover, proponents of the intersectional self credit multiply oppressed people with a certain epistemic advantage Willett In virtue of their suffering and alienation, these individuals are well situated not only to discern which values and practices in their heritage deserve allegiance but also to identify shortcomings in the traditions of the groups to which they belong.
Thus, African-American women are acutely aware of racism within feminism and sexism within the struggle for racial justice. Their intersectional positioning and subjectivity makes such insight virtually unavoidable. While intersectional theorists bring forward race, class, ability, and other socio-economic markers as central to psychical-historical locations of agency, power and connectivity, a number of feminists are increasingly paying attention to somatic-organic factors in selfhood.
Catherine Malabou points to such mental ailments as Alzheimer's disease to raise questions for poststructural and psychoanalytic theories Malabou She reinterprets Derrida's deconstructive self as punctured by experiences of foreignness--of an alterity in the self--through a non-reductive neurobiology of trauma or brain injury.
Injured selves may experience radical discontinuities or lose entirely aspects of their former selves. The resulting picture of the self is a multilayered nexus of relations with psychic-historical and somatic-organic strata. Her work makes clear that philosophies of the self cannot ignore the biological sciences.
Willett takes up Africana, Latina, and other feminist traditions of an interconnected self together with biological and psychological studies of affect, social emotions, and micro and macro biosocial networks. As a social species, the most basic drives and affects of the human self are pro-social, not narcissistic or hedonistic. Maturity does not require abjection, repression, or traumatizing discipline for social cooperation. The capacity for love, friendship, and cooperation with social groups characterizes humans as a biological species.
One consequence of the biosocial drives, as we have seen, is the rejection of the autonomy narrative as the primary or exclusive goal of self-development Willett , , Another consequence of this intermingling of the biological with the social is that intersectionality theory is now extended to include mixed species communities Willett This eco-feminist extension of eros ethics follows from the recentering of ethics on affects and eros social needs and desires for connection rather than on the rational capacities that mark human superiority and separation from the other animal species.
Contrary to dominant metaphysical traditions from the ancients through the moderns, there is no clear ontological gap that separates the human from all other animal life. Willett discerns four strata for envisioning connections across human and nonhuman subjectivities.
These strata correspond to modes of sociality, and typically trace back to aspects of basic social bonds, beginning with the affect-laden eros that connects caregivers with infants. Social affects such as laughter or fear and panic transfer from one creature to another, spreading from an adult to her infant, prompting birds to fly away from a threat in unison, and explaining xenophobic political climates.
Caregivers communicate with the emerging self of the child through non-verbal face-to-face interaction. Species may depend less on the face for communication. Monkeys use tail-wagging and birds sing duets to signal friendship or other social dynamics. The capacity for attunement explains expectations for reciprocity and even a sense of fairness in humans and various other species. Creatures such as elephants, dolphins, and humans suffer trauma when kidnapped from homelands holding ancestral memories and group friendships.
Eros signifies also a yearning for home and a sense of belonging for an unknown range of social animals. Profound acts of moral beauty, explored by evolutionary psychologists in altruistic care for infants and vulnerable group members, can extend to orphans and strangers, revealing moral depth in emotions across a number of species Willett The gut, as a second brain, offers a source of moral response.
The biosocial layering of selfhood reclaims maternal relationality as more than a dumb instinct for humans and any number of other animal species.
Rational rules appealed to by autonomous selves do not guarantee unbiased decisions free from emotional, historical, and biological processes. Feminist critiques of the atomized selves of utilitarian and Kantian philosophy are moving to the center of ethics.
Still, no one theory or model can capture the self's multitudinous and multicultural manifestations. At best, the feminist reconstructions of various traditions, ever themselves spurring new sources of ingroups and outgroups, can serve to remind us that the work of feminism is never done.
As this article attests, there is tremendous foment and variety within the field of feminist work on the self. Yet, in reviewing this literature, we have been struck by a recurrent theme—the inextricability of metaphysical issues about the self from moral and political theory. Feminist critiques of regnant philosophical theories of the self expose the normative underpinnings of these theories.
Feminist analyses of women's agential capacities both acknowledge traditional feminine social contributions and provide accounts of how women can overcome oppressive norms and practices. Feminist reconstructions of the nature of the self are interwoven with arguments that draw out the emancipatory benefits of conceiving the self one way rather than another.
There is nothing surprising, to be sure, about the salience of normative concerns in feminist philosophizing. Still, we mention it because we believe that feminists' attention to political concerns leads to fresh questions that enrich the philosophical understanding of the self. Moreover, we would urge that this forthrightness about the political viewpoint that informs philosophy is a virtue, for overlooking the political suppositions and implications of esoteric philosophical views has led to considerable mischief.
It is precisely the failure to acknowledge that the question of the self is not narrowly metaphysical that has led to philosophy's implicit modeling of the self on a male subject, a tendency that feminist perspectives on the self seek to remediate.
In the interests of concision and readability, the present essay mentions only some of the representative works on the feminist literature on the self. These cited works are collated in the Bibliography which appears in the next section of this essay. However, the feminist literature on the self is vast. Lisa Cassidy, Diana Tietjens Meyers, and Ellie Anderson have put together a comprehensive bibliography of this literature; it attempts to cite all of the books and articles that are relevant to the present entry.
This comprehensive bibliography is linked into the present essay as the following supplementary document:. Reclamation of Women's Agency and Female Identities 3.
Critique Modern philosophy in the West championed the individual. Reclamation of Female Identities and Women's Status Feminist critiques, we have seen, accuse regnant philosophical accounts of masculinizing the self.
Conclusion As this article attests, there is tremendous foment and variety within the field of feminist work on the self. Bibliography Comprehensive Bibliography In the interests of concision and readability, the present essay mentions only some of the representative works on the feminist literature on the self.
This comprehensive bibliography is linked into the present essay as the following supplementary document: Comprehensive Bibliography of Feminist Perspectives on the Self Readers are therefore encouraged to pursue additional references by following the above link.
References The following works are cited in the entry: Studies in Chicano Literature, Culture, and Ideology , eds. Gordon and Christopher Newfield. University of Minnesota Press. The Culture of Microdiversity , ed. Lanham, MD and London: Rowman and Littlefield, Feminist Social Thought , ed. The New Global Constellation. Benhabib, Seyla and Drucilla Cornell, eds.
Benhabib, Seyla, et al. University of California Press. Trauma, Memory, and Personal Identity. A Feminist Reading in Political Theory. The Ethics of Eros: Irigaray's Rewriting of the Philosophers. University of Calgary Press. Knowledge, Consiousness, and the Politics of Empowerment. Bartlett and Rosanne Kennedy. Black Feminism and 2 Live Crew. Making Sense of Intersex: Changing Ethical Perspectives in Biomedicine.
Gendered Readings of Change: Fraser, Nancy, and Nicholson, Linda. What are Friends For? In a Different Voice. Darwinian Reflections on Life, Politics, and Art. Moral Voices, Moral Selves. Pennsylvania State University Press.
Feminist Social Thought Meyers ———. The Ethics of Care. Foucault, Ethics, and Normalized Bodies. Speculum of the other woman. This Sex which is not one. An Ethics of Sexual Difference. Feminist Politics and Human Nature.
The Context of a Black Feminist Ideology. Feminist Social Thought Meyers Desire in Language , eds. The one we most neglect, however, is the extraordinary way that relations of sexuality, love and desiring are so fundamentally grounded on property relations. The sexual act has become an aim in itself—just another way of obtaining pleasure, through lust sharpened with excesses and through distorted, harmful titillations of the flesh ….
Prostitution is the organized expression of this distortion of the sex drive.. This may sound rather puritanical in an age of increasing acceptance of anything that will intensify the pleasures of sensuousness—even pain and violence. But Kollontai demonstrated that the pursuit of pleasure as a performance of freedom is a very specific historical practice of the owning classes and is not the basis for egalitarian, sharing relations of mutual sexual pleasure and personal regard among people.
The valorization of excessive stimulation, excitation and sensation as ends in themselves distorts human relations and capabilities and is a direct reflection of the alienating commodification and exploitation of human relations that arises with capitalism.
In a society where the division of labor becomes more accentuated, where the vast majority of people are deliberately deprived of creativity, where work has no other value than its explicit monetary one, sexuality becomes a means of escaping from society through self-centered sexual consumption, rather than the full expression of interpersonal relationships Part 5, 2.
Left sexual theories commonly represent sexual excess and transgressive pleasures as subversive of bourgeois morality and thus as emancipatory practices—this is, for example, a frequent postmodern defense of pornography e. But this fundamentally fails to recognize the relations involved and instead to further promote the ideology of individual consumption and personal gratification against the interests and well being of others.
In contrast to bourgeois property relations and individual gratification in sexual relations, Kollontai argued that socialist relations of production—which are no longer organized around profit and the exploitation of labor of others—create the conditions for profoundly different interpersonal relations. As regards sexual relations, communist morality demands first of all an end to all relations based on financial or other economic considerations. The buying and selling of caresses destroys the sense of equality between the sexes, and thus undermines the basis of solidarity without which communist society cannot exist.
The stronger the ties between the members of the collective as a whole, the less the need to reinforce marital relations emphasis added, Kollontai opened up a complex, integrated and materialist understanding of the revolutionary possibility of relationships no longer based in any way on commodification, economic exchange or financial considerations. Instead, she envisioned truly free—that is, equal—relations of love and comradeship necessary both for human fulfillment and for sustaining the connections among members in a collective.
Mutual recognition of the rights of the other, of the fact that one does not own the heart and soul of the other the sense of property, encouraged by bourgeois culture. Comradely sensitivity, the ability to listen and understand the inner workings of the loved person bourgeois culture demanded this only from the woman.
Kollontai firmly believed in the emancipatory potential of non-commodified and thus non-possessive relations among free individuals not bound by economic dependency.
Such radical changes will not occur automatically—they require, as Kollontai made very clear, unrelenting, all-embracing social and ideological struggle as an integral part of the class struggle to build a new social formation. Such charges are, of course, part of the neoliberal propaganda aimed at legitimating the entrepreneurs of desire as citizens of freedom. A red theory of sexuality, as Kollontai demonstrated, is an understanding of the inseparable dialectical relation of sex and the material relations of production.
It is a commitment to ending the economic exploitation and commodification of relations, and the social divisions of labor and desire. It is the struggle to build free and equal relations of love, sexuality and comradeship in which desire is neither simply sexual nor exclusive, but involves a solidarity of multiple connections and interrelations to others as well as to the work and welfare of the collective.
These are relations that cannot be developed in a social formation dominated by property relations as the signifier of individual freedom. It attempts to halt, among other things, the struggle toward Red Love: Yes—if we accept as inevitable the current neoliberalism and its tyranny of exploitative relations, social divisions of labor and commodified individualism of capitalism.
But for Kollontai and other Bolsheviks in the early years of the Russian Revolution such relationships were a very real historical possibility. Their failure is a historical, political and economic problem that we need to carefully analyze—not just erase as obsolete—in order to learn why they failed and how to actualize the full possibilities of free and equal relations of love, sexuality and social collectivity Kollontai articulated.
What such an examination would enable us to understand is how profoundly dialectical is the problem: The Life of Aleksandra Kollontai.
At its core, feminism is “the belief that men and women should have equal Yes, absolutely. Ruffalo opened up about his own mother's experience of having an I invite you to search your soul and ask yourself if you actually stand which promotes body love and self-acceptance in women, to openly. With her particular brand of feminism, Stein is a voice for modern times. Her answer is, “Yes,” because the nature of the human soul itself, the reason it The soul of woman must be expansive and open to all human beings, Woman naturally seeks to embrace that which is living, personal, and whole. They want the door held open for them, a shared umbrella, and yes, sometimes even economically when they are with a man. This phenomenon may not seem fair to men who seek a relationship founded on equal support, care, can cause even the feminists among us to feel that we deserve to be.